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CONSTRUING THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE:




The purpose of this article is to identify and evaluate the keys pro-
vided by the Uniform Commercial Code for the construction and appli-
cation of its provisions. Before undertaking this task, however, it is
essential that the posture of the typical marketing lawsuit be described.
Only by clearly identifying the basic problems involved in a marketing
lawsuit-problems which as we shall see are common to the great majority
of lawsuits-and the general expectations of the parties thereto, can we
hope to assess the adequacy of the keys to Code interpretation.
I
ANGLO-AMERICAN JURISTIC BACKGROUND
Courts in Deciding Cases Must Somehow Choose What Version of the
Facts to Accept as Correct and What Rule of Law to Apply
to those Facts
Parties to lawsuits practically always disagree about the facts. This
is as true of disputes in sales and marketing as elsewhere. Details of
current marketing practices continually change and individual contract
terms often differ from one deal to the next. So also, the details and short-
comings related to the performance of contracts give rise to disputes.'
Parties have conflicting versions of what happened. Courts and juries
must choose what version of disputed facts to accept as correct. 2 Their
guide in that choice? Truth, not falsehood. Accuracy, not distortion. That
choice often is the most important decision in the case.3 For any particular
t A.B. 1910, LL.B. 1913, S.J.D. 1914, Harvard University. Professor of Law, Hastings
College of Law.
1 For an example of such difficulty, see Boeing Airplane Co. v. O'Malley, 329 F.2d 589,
587-88 (8th Cir. 1964) (conflicting testimony about alleged misleading representations
inducing deal for an identified defective used plane to be flown back from Europe). For
further examples, see note 4 infra.
2 Justice Peters made the following comment: "A lawsuit is not a game. It is an attempt
to ascertain the true facts, and to apply the law to the true facts." Dowell v. Superior
Court, 296 P.2d 97, 99 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956). A later hearing before the Supreme Court
of California in this case, though vacating the opinion below, came to the same conclusion
as to the relief sought. Dowell v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 2d 483, 304 P.2d 1009 (1956).
3 Justice Irving R. Kaufman of the United States Court of Appeals made the following
observations:
The advocate's task is to help the judge and jury make the distinction between good
and bad, true and false, by bringing forth the facts . . . . Any event, simple or
49
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lawsuit the court and jury determine the facts subject to review on
appeal.4 Little question may then remain about which rule or principle of
law should be applied in the dispute.5
Disputing parties often may still disagree, however, about which rule
or principle of law correctly applies to the facts as thus determined.
They do not see the underlying merits at stake the same way. Bias of
self-interest strongly tends to distort their view. The tribunal deciding
such a case thus willy-nilly faces a double choice. (1) What version of the
facts to accept as correct?6 (2) Which rule or principle of law is on the
merits the correct one to apply to these facts?
7
About underlying merits claimed by disputing parties, much may often
be honestly asserted on both sides. The choice that correctly fits the case
may be uncertain. Precedents exactly in point very often are lacking.
Close analogies may be lacking or conflicting. Analogies more remote
from the exact marketing facts in the dispute are usually inconclusive,
often conflicting. What standard shall then guide the court to choose
correctly what decision to give?8
complex, is susceptible of an infinity of more or less reasonable-but honest-inter-
pretations. This is made inevitable simply by the construction of the human
mind and the fallibility of human judgment and perception.
The trial lawyer presents one version or interpretation of the facts, the one
most favorable to his client, and his opposing advocate does the same. Perhaps some
place between the two versions is what actually happened. The system of adversary
proceedings is based on the premise that the best presentation of both versions of the
facts will result in a close enough approximation of truth so as to be classifiable as
justice.
Kaufman, "The Trial Lawyer," 50 A.B.A.J. 25, 26 (1964).
The late Justice Robert H. Jackson was also concerned with this problem. See Jackson,
"Advocacy Before the Supreme Court," 37 A.B.A.J. 801, 803 (1951):
The purpose of a hearing is that the Court may learn What it does not know, and
it knows least about the facts . . . . [M]ost contentions of law are won or lost
on the facts . . . . A large part of the time of conference is given to discussion
of facts, to determine under what rule they fall. Dissents'are not usually rooted in
disagreement as to a rule of law but as to whether the facts warrant its application.
4 In sales cases, as in other cases, the familiar rule is often applied that, though
evidence is conflicting, verdicts or findings of fact that are supported by substantial
competent evidence will not be reversed on appeal unless shown to be clearly wrong.
Woodbine v. Van Horn, 29 Cal. 2d 95, 173 P.2d 17 (1946) (sale of wood); Maecherlein v.
Sealy Mattress Co., 145 Cal. App. 2d 275, 302 P.2d 331 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956) (defective
mattress); Dills v. Delira Corp., 145 Cal. App. 2d 124, 302 P.2d 397 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956)
(contract for sale of interest in radio shows) ; Rosen v. Garston, 319 Mass. 390, 66 N.E.2d
29 (1946) (printed circulars).
5 See notes 2-3 supra.
6 See note 4 supra.
7 Justice (later Chief justice) Harlan F. Stone of the United States Supreme Court
stated in "Common Law in the United States," 50 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 7-8 (1936):
[Liaw guided by precedent which has grown out of one type of experience can
only slowly and with difficulty be adapted to new types which the changing scene
may bring .... [T]he common-law rule of precedent is not an unyielding one . . ..
[JIudicial decisions are but evidence of the law, which is sometimes misrepresented
by a bad precedent.... Coke . . . had declared that inconvenience in the results of a
rule established by precedent is strong argument to prove that the precedent itself is
contrary to the law.... [T~he bad precedent must on occasion yield to the better reason.
See also Justice Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 10-17 (1921).
8 [Wlhen there is no decisive precedent . . . the judge . . . must then fashion law
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A Basic Standard of Justice-Greatest Practicable Fulfilment of Human
Wants With Least Practicable Frustration of Other Human Wants;
More Loosely Said: Public Policy, Public Interest, Social Interest
Involved in every marketing lawsuit are conflicting human interests.
They can be seen as conflicting claims, demands and desires.9
What is the basic standard for doing justice according to law where
the merits are in doubt? Tentative answer: To satisfy such conflicting
human interests as fully as practicable."
As guides pointing toward reaching a correct decision, familiar maxims
or slogans connote lofty but vague ideals of justice: understandingly,
not blindly; wisely, not foolishly; fairly, not unfairly; reasonably, not
arbitrarily; justly, not unjustly.
, Doing its duty, the court tries to administer justice correctly according
to law. In doing so, the court necessarily must somehow appraise or
weigh conflicting human interests. This it must do according to some
scale of values, according to some standard of justice which for control-
ling application in the instance the court finds acceptable in reason.1
for the litigants before him. In fashioning it for them, he will be fashioning it for
others . . . . If the judge is to pronounce it wisely, some principles of selection
there must be to guide him among all the potential judgments that compete for
recognition. . . .Not all the progeny of principles begotten of a judgment survive
to maturity. Those that cannot prove their worth and strength by the test
of experience . . . are thrown into the void. The principles themselves are con-
tinually retested; for if the rules derived from a principle do not work well, the
principle itself must ultimately be re-examined.
Cardozo, supra note 7, at 21-23 (quoting Munroe Smith). Reference might also be made to
Judge Schettino's concurring opinion in Sofman v. Denham Food Serv. Inc., 37 N.J. 304,
313, 181 A.2d 168, 173 (1962) ("Judge-made law is always subject to re-examination");
Pound, Law Finding Through Experience and Reason 1 (1960) ("Law is experience
developed by reason and corrected by further experience").
Justice Harlan F. Stone, supra note 7, at 10-11 observed:
It is just here, within the limited area where the judge has freedom of choice of the
rule which he is to adopt, and in his comparison of the experiences of the past
with those of the present, that occurs the most critical and delicate operation in the
process of judicial law making. Strictly speaking, he is often engaged not so much
in extracting a rule of law from the precedents . . . as in making an appraisal and
comparison of social values, the result of which may be of decisive weight in deter-
mining what rule he is to apply....
f .... Law performs its functions adequately only when it is suited to the way of life
ofa people. With social change comes the imperative demand that law shall satisfy
the needs which change has created, and so the problem, above all others, of juris-
prudence in the modern world is the reconciliation of the demands, paradoxical and to
some extent conflicting, that Jaw shall at. once have continuity with the past and
adaptability to the present and the future.
9 Pound, "A Survey of Social Interests," 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1943), reprinted in
Vanderbilt, Studying Law 439 (1945). See also Pound, supra note 8.
10 Among the most notable works on how judges decide cases are Cardozo's three
booklets: Paradoxes of Legal Science (1928), The Growth of the Law (1924), and The
Nature of the Judicial Process (1921). See also, Pound, "The Theory of Judicial Deci-
sion," (pts. 1-3), 36 Harv. L. Rev. 641, 802, 940 (1.922-1923) and note 8 supra.
11 See note 8 supra.
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Our Anglo-American system of justice does not accept brute force as
a standard of justice.'" Neither does it accept the arbitrary will of the
ruler, 13 nor of the judge.'" What is arbitrary is deeply felt as tyrannical
and unjust-the opposite of what is fair, reasonable, and just. All this can
be seen as readily in marketing disputes as elsewhere.
From the Golden Rule' 5 to the maxims of equity to the now repudiated
requirement of privity for warranty liability,16 Anglo-American juris-
prudence abounds with examples of general principles for the settlement
of legal disputes. Such generalized ideals, however, are abstract and
vague and seldom, if ever, directly answer the difficult and doubtful ques-
tions of application with respect to conflicting human interests. Counsel
therefore must prepare to answer for the court this question: In this
particular dispute, how do such ideals of justice correctly apply?
Our system, it seems, has long used a familiar juristic process of
weighing conflicting human interests to find which of the available rules
best fits the dispute in question. This process involves two distinct
aspects: (1) Attempt to point out what overlapping conflicting human
interests, individual and social, are at stake in -the actual dispute. (2)
Attempt to weigh or balance these conflicting interests according to the
scale of their understood social value or importance.
"Interests" as used in this connection means "claims or demands or
desires which human beings . . . seek to satisfy." Which of the con-
flicting human claims, demands, and desires at stake in the case are least
valuable? Which are most valuable? For "the greatest practicable fulfil-
ment of human wants," how far must one interest give way to the other?' 8
12 During World War II many nations took part in resisting the bluntly declared
brute-force dogma: "The Might of the Conqueror . . . alone makes right." Hitler,
Mein Kampf 949 (1924).
13 On this issue, three well-known royal examples: Charles I lost his head on the
scaffold; James II lost his throne; George III lost the American Colonies that became
the United States of America.
14 Judicial action is, in our system, subject to appeal as to its correctness. For personal
misconduct individual judges are subject to the same legal accountability, both civil
and criminal, as other persons.
15 Jesus, as reported in Matthew 7:12; Luke 6:31; see also Leviticus 19:17.
16 Warranty actions were originally limited to those between the original buyer and
original seller. However, subsequent cases ignored the formalistic privity requirement and
extended the protection of the warranty to members of the buyer's household. More-
over, recent cases have permitted a remote business buyer to bring an action against the
manufacturer. See Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d
81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963); Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d
5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962) ; Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d
773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961).
17 See note 9 supra.
18 Chief justice Hughes, writing for the Court in United States v. Chambers, 291
U.S. 217, 226 (1934), stated that "it is a familiar maxim of the common law that when
the reason for a rule ceases the rule also ceases." Similarly, Justice Cardozo, in Clark
v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933) commented:
The social policy that will prevail in many situations may run foul in others of a
different social policy, competing for supremacy. It is then the function of a court
[Vol. so
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This balance19 must be struck in the light of the applicable individual
interests, public interests, and social interests: often tagged with the more
familiar but less precise term of public policy. The court's grasp of under-
lying merits, under whatever label tagged, guides the trend of judicial
decisions2
Under Anglo-American Justice According to Law, a Lawsuit
Attempts To Apply to the True Version of the Available
Facts the Available Law That Really Fits the Case.
For This the Lawyer at the Outset in Advising
His Client Must Make the Basic Choices
That Are Necessary
More closely analyzed, a lawsuit is a triple attempt21: (1) to correctly
ascertain the true version of the relevant facts; (2) to correctly find out
what rules or principles of law are available for possible application to the
dispute; and (3) to correctly-that is, fairly, reasonably, and justly-(a)
choose, (b) interpret, (c) construe, and (d) apply to the correct (true)
to mediate between them, assigning, so far as possible, a proper value to each, and
summoning to its aid all the distinctions and analogies that are the tools of the
judicial process.
19 See note 9 supra.
20 justice Holmes, The Common Law (1881), made the following observations:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities
of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy,
avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow men,
have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by
which men should be governed.
Id. at 1.
The very considerations which judges most rarely mention, and always with an
apology, are the secret root from which the law draws all the juices of life. I mean,
of course, considerations of what is expedient for the community concerned. Every
important principle which is developed by litigations is in fact and at bottom the
result of more or less definitely understood views of public policy; most generally,
to be sure, under our practice and traditions, the unconscious result of instinctive
preferences and inarticulate convictions, but none the less traceable to views of public
policy in the last analysis.
Id. at 35-36. The process in actual operation can readily be seen on comparing majority
and dissenting opinions in the Supreme Court of the United States in dealing with
issues of great public importance. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (consti-
tutionality of a Uniform Code of Military justice provision extending jurisdiction of
court martial to civilians accompanying forces abroad in peace time; note particularly the
diverse views of the judges touching the grave underlying issues in question) ; Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (illegality of President Truman's
executive seizure of steel mills without statutory authority); Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 (1951) (constitutionality of. the Smith Act directed at conspiracy to teach
or advocate the overthrow of the Government by force or violence); Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649 (1944) (unconstitutionality of state restrictions excluding Negroes from
voting in primary election for nomination of Democratic candidates for the United States
Senate and House of Representatives); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1 (1937) (constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act); NLRB v. Fansteel
Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939) (illegality of sitdown strikes involving seizure
of employer's plant and related physical violence; such conduct by striking employees
not protected activity under the National Labor Relations Act).
21 See note 7 supra.
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version of the relevant facts (e) that available law (f) which really fits
22the case.
The purpose of this analysis of a lawsuit is to illustrate the basic pattern
of what the lawyer in giving legal advice needs to find out and to do. In
this respect the lawyer is from the outset "on the spot." Parties to disputes,
actual or expected, come to him for advice. Their particular dispute has
never been before any court or jury. At the outset, the lawyer must make
the basic choices necessary to guide the client correctly in what course of
action to take. For giving correct advice, 'the before-mentioned pattern
points to what the lawyer needs to find out and do.
In this respect the choices that can become the most difficult to make
come in category three mentioned above. This type of choice has many
ramifications. To choose correctly in this respect the lawyer must go
beyond rigid and inflexible rules of law. He needs to be aware of the
choices opposing parties can persuasively urge the court to make and also
how those choices may fulfil or frustrate conflicting wants. He must also
be aware, under the existing circumstances, of the relative weight or im-
portance of these conflicting human interests according to the scale of
their social value which the court in reason may recognize and accept as
correct.23
If the matter comes to court instead of being earlier settled, the lawyer
then needs in addition to be able and ready understandingly to inform the
court both what and why; more precisely stated, that his choice is correct
under the existing circumstances, and why it is correct 2 4
The Court's Choices, Informed by Counsel, in Weighing or Balancing
Conflicting Human Interests Largely Guide the Policy Trends of Their
Judicial Decisions
Some of the basic "arguable" questions that commonly come up in
lawsuits can be generally answered as follows25 :
22 See notes 2-3, 7 supra.
23 See notes 3, 7-8 supra.
24 Justice Frankfurter made the following comment:
Human society keeps changing. Needs emerge, first vaguely felt and unexpressed,
imperceptibly gathering strength, steadily becoming more and more exigent, generating
a force which, if left unheeded and denied response so as to satisfy the impulse
behind it at least in part, may burst forth with an intensity that exacts more than
reasonable satisfaction. Law as the response to these needs is not merely a system of
logical deduction, though considerations of logic are far from irrelevant. Law pre-
supposes sociological wisdom as well as logical unfolding.
Frankfurter, "The Process of Judging in Constitutional Cases," in An Autobiography of
the Supreme Court 270 (Weston ed. 1963). See also notes 3, 7 supra.
25 Justice Peters (the Presiding Justice of the California District Court of Appeal,
later a Justice of the Supreme Court of California) observed that "in most cases the
chief difficulty of the brief writer is not to prove a certain legal proposition, but to
demonstrate that that proposition is applicable to the specific facts of the case in hand."
22 Cal. State Bar J. 175, 180 (1947). See also note 3 supra.
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1. What is "that available law which really fits the case?" Answer:
That rule (or principle) whose requisites for liability or its absence the
correct version of the facts really fulfil.
2. What does "applying that rule of law to the facts" mean? Answer:
The facts shown support claims made if they fulfil that rule's requisites
for liability; if not, they do not. "Applying that rule to the facts" means
deciding whether or not the facts shown fulfil that rule's requisites for
liability.
3. In its application, how is the rule (or principle) that really fits
the case to be construed? Answer: As broadly or narrowly as reason-
ably required to achieve the purpose (or redress the mischief) toward
which that rule (or principle) is aimed. 6
26 Justice Frankfurter contended: "Nor, indeed, has much been added by way of gen-
eralities to the wisdom of the resolutions in Heydon's Case, as reported in the robust
English of Coke's Reports." Frankfurter, "Foreword to Symposium on Statutory Construc-
tion," 3 Vand. L. Rev. 365 (1950).
The "mischief rule" thus proclaimed by Sir Edward Coke, to which Justice Frankfurter
refers is reported in 2 Coke Rep. 7, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (1584) as follows:
[F]or the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or
beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned
and considered: 1st. What was the common law before the making of the Act? 2nd.
What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide? 3rd.
What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the
commonwealth, and 4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all
Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance
the remedy ....
Stone, supra note 7, at 12-15 stated:
Judge-made law, which at its best must normally lag somewhat behind experience, was
unable to keep pace with the rapid change, and it could find in the law books no
adequate pattern into which the new experience could be readily fitted. It was in-
evitable that the attempt should be made to supply the unsatisfied need by recourse
to legislation.
.... The reception which the courts have accorded to statutes presents a curiously
illogical chapter in the history of the common law. Notwithstanding their genius for
the generation of new law from that already established, the common-law courts have
given little recognition to statutes as starting points for judicial law-making com-
parable to judicial decisions ...
The attitude of our courts toward statute law presents a contrast to that of the
civilians who have been more ready to regard statutes in the light of the thesis of the
civil law that its precepts are statements of general principles, to be used as guides
to decision. Under that system a new statute may be viewed as an exemplification of
a general principle which is to take its place beside other precepts, whether found in
codes or accepted expositions of the jurists, as an integral part of the system, there
to be extended to analagous situations not within its precise terms. With the modem
practice of drawing a statute as a statement of a general rule, I can perceive no
obstacle which need have precluded our adoption of a similar attitude except our
unfamiliarity with the civilian habit of thought.
... I can find in the history and principles of the common law no adequate reason
for our failure to treat a statute much more as we treat a judicial precedent, as both
a declaration and a source of law, and as a premise for legal reasoning. We have done
practically that with our ancient statutes, such as the statutes of limitations, frauds
and wills, readily molding them to fit new conditions within their spirit, though not
their letter. . . . [T]he social policy and judgment, expressed in legislation by the law-
making agency which is supreme, would seem to merit that judicial recognition which
is freely accorded to the like expression of judicial precedent ....
It is difficult to appraise the consequences of the perpetuation of incongruities
and injustices in the law by this habit of narrow construction of statutes and by the
failure to recognize that, as recognitions of social policy, they are as significant and
rightly as much a part of the law, as the rules declared by judges.
1964]
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4. Each of several divergent rules (or principles) may literally fit
the case. Where so, by what standard of merit is one rule rather than
another chosen for application? Substantially the same answer may be
given in two alternative forms:
a. Under Anglo-American common law, (1) choose that rule or prin-
ciple deemed most likely to achieve the greatest practicable fulfilment of
human wants with the least practicable frustration of other human
wants; (2) the choice should be made reasonably, guided not by emotion,
but by reason as informed by known experience
7
b. Under the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, (1) choose
the provision (or interpretation based thereon) deemed most likely to
achieve the purpose (or redress the mischief) toward which that provi-
sion of the Uniform Commercial Code was aimed.
2
1
The lawyer's job in effectively giving advice includes making vital
choices. Without litigation, by advice based on correct choices, the lawyer
can best keep clients out of trouble. His advice, of course, may be chal-
lenged by lawsuit. If so, he can then show the court why on the merits
his advice was correct.2
As pictured in the words of a noted modern jurist: "Any problem can
be solved if only one principle is involved but . . . unfortunately all
controversies of importance involve if not a conflict at least an interplay
of principles.""0 This difficulty is accentuated by the nature of the
marketing process. Not only are marketing practices continually chang-
ing but also public attitudes toward current marketing practices are also
apt to change. Underlying assumptions about what is long-run sound mar-
keting policy are constantly being challenged and re-examined afresh.
Here, then, is a deep-seated but very important question in sales cases.
Will this decision as a precedent help the useful process of buying and
selling, that is, does this decision help to move goods from original maker
to final user? If so, this decision will prima facie tend toward greatest
fulfilment of human wants with least practicable frustration of other hu-
man wants, and, according to that standard of justice, the decision would
seem to be basically right.3 If not, it may be on the merits questionable.
Examples of this process of balancing the interests described above, can
.... [A] statute is not an alien intruder in the house of the common law, but a guest
to be welcomed and made at home there as a new and powerful aid in the accomplish-
ment of its appointed task of accommodating the law to social needs.
See also note 52 infra.
27 See notes 8-9 supra.
28 See note 26 supra and note 52 infra.
29 See note 20 supra.
30 Frankfurter, "The Supreme Court in The Mirror of Justice," 44 A.BA.J. 723, 802
(1958).
81 See notes 8-10 supra.
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be seen in cases involving: the Statute of Frauds; 2 Technical cash
sales; 3 Future goods; 4 Insistent groping in sales disputes for increased
negotiability of goods; " Protection of original owners against fraudulent
buyers and their good faith purchasers or creditors; 16 and, so-called war-
ranty disputes. 7
II
BUYERS' COMMON PURPOSE IN MARKETING DEALS
Buyers' Common Purpose in Marketing Deals-To Get Goods He Needs
When and Where He Needs Them
A buyer buys goods or he contracts ahead for goods. Normally all goes
well and there is no serious dispute. More often there is no dispute at all.
The buyer gets the goods he needs when and where he needs them. The
other party has fully performed.
With but little change in wording this general description still fits the
facts where the buyer is a dealer. He buys or contracts ahead for goods
to sell again to customers at his store. So, too, where the buyer is a
manufacturer, canner or other processor. He buys or contracts ahead
for raw materials: ore, steel, wire, pears, peaches, etc. These he will
make into finished products for the market. Here, too, in ordinary deals,
all usually goes well. No serious disputes. No lawsuits.
For the marketing process as a whole this individual purpose is com-
mon to all kinds of deals in all kinds of goods. The buyer expects full
performance of the deal as made, 3 not default and a valid claim for
damages. For the marketing process as a whole the broader common
general purpose can be seen which each individual buyer and seller has
more or less consciously shared: to move the goods another step along
their marketing road from original maker to final user for the fulfilment
of human needs. Moreover, the needs which the marketing process as a
whole aims to fulfil continually change and grow.
82 See the forthcoming Uniform Commercial Code edition of Vold, Sales §§ 15-23.
3 Id. §§ 30-31.
34 Id. §§ 49-52.
85 Id. §§ 31, 89.
S6 Id. §§ 90-93.
87 Id. §§ 94-104.
38 Some of the basic functions of the marketing process are described in an editorial in
the Wall St. Journal, Aug. 8, 1961, p. 12, col. 1, reprinted in 41 PG & E Progress 4 (May
1964). See also remarks of Frederick R. Kappel, Chairman of American Telephone and
Telegraph Company, at Annual Meeting of Share Owners, April 15, 1964 (see Annual Report
at 7).
Mr. Donner, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of General Motors, commented:
"To meet the challenge of the market place, we must recognize changes in customer needs
and desires far enough ahead to have the right products in the right places at the right
time and in the right quantity." Quoted in Sloan, My Years With General Motors 440




Importance of This Common Purpose on How To Construe and Apply
Code Law In Marketing Deals
For users to get goods needed when and where needed-this common
purpose may be very important on how to construe and apply Code law
in particular marketing disputes. Life's currently changing and growing
needs stimulate voluntary current adaptation of marketing practices to
fulfil these needs. The Code recognizes the problems raised by this ever-
changing market pattern in section 1-106(1):
The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered to
the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the
other party had fully performed....
Examples of changing marketing practices abound for all to see who
care to look. Each of us, going through life's successive stages, is a living
example of changing and growing needs. Our changing and growing needs
in any one of -these stages are hardly recognizable in many of the details
we need in the next. Each passing generation goes through life-stages
roughly similar in outline, but widely differing in many of the details
needed.
Parties voluntarily adapt their current marketing practices to fulfil
currently changing and growing needs pursuant to the common purpose
to furnish the goods when and where needed. The terms of current deals
have their own surrounding circumstances. Often both terms and cir-
cumstances differ widely from those among other parties ten years ago,
or even a year ago. Legal precedents between other parties at earlier
times may not closely fit current terms or circumstances which aim to
fulfil presently changing and growing needs39
Disputes in current deals arise. One or the other party can readily
and persuasively claim that the rule from an earlier precedent does not
apply. Prima facie, if the reason for the rule still fits, the rule still ap-
plies. If its reason now fails, the reverse is true.40
Such common-law arguments, it seems, are familiarly phrased on the
pattern of certain vague abstract ideals about reason or justice. These
abstract ideals are often expressed in sweeping universalized legal max-
39 Ways, "The Era of Radical Change," Fortune, May 1964, p. 113 stated:
For many changes come about through the business system, which has an active role
to play between the discoverers on one hand and the consumers on the other. . .. A
larger and more intricate mediation of values and purposes occurs in "the market,"
meaning thousands of interconnected markets, where the public exercises ever increas-
ing power through billions of daily decisions. The resultant of all these corporate and
consumer decisions alters the very conditions of life.
40 See notes 7-8 supra.
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ims or epigrams omitting any reference to practical limitations on their
application as learned from experience.
Such maxims or epigrams are by themselves not dependable guides
on how to construe and apply law correctly. Experience has shown this
abundantly.41 A great number of maxims and epigrams can be found.
Maxim can answer maxim. Epigram can repel epigram.42 As guides on
how to construe and apply law correctly, common law maxims and
epigrams prove frustratingly elusive.
Applied as guides in deals aimed to fulfil changing and growing needs,
such maxims and epigrams produce neither uniformity nor certainty.
All too often their application ignores the basic purpose of parties in
marketing deals-to get goods to the user when and where he needs them
to fulfil his changing and growing needs. Though this basic purpose is
recognized by the directive of Uniform Commercial Code section 1-
106(1) that Code remedies shall "be liberally administered to the end
that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other
party had fully performed," the technical and unduly narrow in-
terpretation of prior remedial legislation often gave rise to fresh conflict
of available legal authorities and great uncertainty in marketing deals
rather than fulfiling these basic needs. 41 Our separate so-called Uniform
Acts at times seem to intensify rather than to cure, both these difficulties
41 Experience has abundantly shown that reasoning does not always employ reason
reasonably. See Pound, Law Finding Through Experience and Reason ix (1960).
42 Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition 521-35 (1960), reprinted in part from
Llewellyn & Driscoll, "Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed," 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395-406 (1950) which
contains 26 examples on "Thrust" and "Parry." Nineteen other examples on "Thrust" and
"Counter-thrust" were gathered for the 1960 volume by J. A. Spanogle, Jr.
"Thrust" and "Parry" are illustrated by Llewellyn, supra, at 528, example 28:
Thrust. A proviso qualifies the provision immediately preceding. State ex rel. Higgs
v. Summers, 118 Neb. 189, 223 N.W. 957 (1929).
Parry. It may dearly be intended to have a wider scope. Reuter v. San Mateo County,
220 Cal. 314, 30 P.2d 417 (1934).
An example of "Thrust" and "Counterthrust" is found in id. at 529, example 3:
Thrust. The meaning of a word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning
of words associated with it. International Rice Milling Co. v. NLRB, 183 F.2d 21, 25
(5th Cir. 1950).
Counterthrust. A word may have a character of its own not to be submerged by
its association. Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514, 519 (1923).
A recent vivid example of opposing epigrams in the same trial and in the same appeal is
Bell v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 668 (1960), rev'd, 366 U.S. 393 (1961) (application
of U.S. Army regulations pursuant to a statute in the case of allied prisoners captured in
the Korean War who had been brainwashed by the Communists).
43 E.g., the Negotiable Instruments Law was enacted practically word for word in
all American jurisdictions. Nevertheless, conflict of authority resulted with respect to
over 80 of its 196 sections. The highest courts of different jurisdictions had construed
them differently. Hawkland, Commercial Paper (Negotiable Instruments-Under the Uni-
form Commercial Code) v (1959). On the same point, see Malcolm, "The Uniform Com-
mercial Code," 39 Ore. L. Rev. 318, 319 (1960); Schnader, "Why the Commercial Code
Should be Uniform," 69 Com. L.J. 117, 118 (1964).
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despite their concern "to make uniform the laws of those states which
enact [the particular Act]. . . 44
III
UCC PURPOSES AND POLICIES SERVE TO FULFIL BUYERS'
COMMON PURPosE
The Uniform Commercial Code's Own Twin Keys on How To Construe
and Apply Its Own Provisions-Uniformity and Evolutionary Growth-
Important for Fulfiling Buyers' Common Purpose
The Uniform Commercial Code furnishes its own twin keys on how
to construe and apply Code law to disputes in marketing deals. (1) Uni-
formity, and (2) Evolutionary Growth.
The Code in section 1-102 expressly recognizes the inherent need for
both of these keys. Construed and applied with use of both, the Code
clearly affords greatly improved adaptation of the law to the common pur-
pose of parties in marketing deals. The Code thus provides a much
better adaptation than do our separate Uniform Acts whose provisions for
construing their terms sharply single out uniformity but largely ignore
evolutionary growth.
Uniformity: For Stability and Reasonable
Certainty in Commercial Dealings
The Code expresses one of its main purposes and policies as follows:
"to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions." Section
1-102 (2) (c).
Moreover, the Code "shall be liberally construed and applied to pro-
mote" this underlying purpose and policy. Section 1-102 (1).
Thereby the Code strongly supports stability in commercial relations.
The same idea is familiar under other labels-reasonable certainty in
commercial dealings; security of transactions. Users need performance
of deals when and where needed, not merely a valid claim for damages.4 5
44 The two most important, Sales and Negotiable Instruments, were drafted respectively
in 1906 and 1892, and have persisted substantially unaltered since, despite the enormous
changes in the scope and form of commercial and financial activity. The various inter-
pretations of these old statutes have also seriously undermined the original concept of
uniformity among the states. N.J. Comm'n on the UCC 19 (2d Rep't 1960) prepared
by Professor Hawkland.
Marko v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 24 N.J. Super. 295, 299-303, 94 A.2d 348, 350-52 (Super.
Ct. 1953) reviews sharply conflicting decisions from other jurisdictions on how to construe
and apply Sales Act, §§ 69(2), 70 on the question of whether damages may also be
recovered after rescission for breach of warranty.
For further examples relating to the NIL, see Schnader, "The New Commercial Code,"
36 A.B.A.J. 179 (1950).
45 It is an old cliche that with increased speeds of communication and transportation
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In this underlying policy of uniformity we would usually find the best
prima facie guide for construing the Code's other provisions. 6 However,
unlike our separate Uniform Acts, the Code, as a basic guide to constru-
ing its other provisions also emphasizes evolutionary growth.
Evolutionary Growth: 1. To Modernize Applicable Law and Expand
Commercial Practices: To Vary the Effect of Most Code Provisions
May Be Varied by Agreement
Parallel with uniformity as an underlying Code purpose and policy,
as recited in the before-mentioned section 1-102 (2) (c), the Code in section
1-102(2) recites two other "underlying purposes and policies" as follows:
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial trans-
actions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through
custom, usage and agreement of the parties....
Evolutionary growth-through these two underlying Code purpose
and policy aspects stated in subdivisions (a) and (b) of subsection (2)
-makes its distinct statutory trumpet call. Moreover, the Code, through
section 1-102(1), "shall be liberally construed and applied to promote"
these two "underlying purposes and policies."
In addition, the Code, in section 1-102 (3), strongly supports evolution-
ary growth by expressly providing that:
(3) The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement,
[and] ... the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which
the performance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are
not manifestly unreasonable.
We can look at these "underlying purposes and policies," as above
recited in Code section 1-102 in its two subdivisions (a) and (b) of sub-
the world grows smaller every day. So also do the United States and the several states
in the United States. With business, commerce and financing becoming increasingly
interstate, it is seriously inefficient to have the degree of variation in rules of com-
mercial law presently existing between one state and another. Commerce does not
flow nearly as smoothly as it might and a major objective of the Code is to modernize
the rules and make them uniform in the several states so that commerce, business and
finance can operate more efficiently.
Malcolm, "The Uniform Commercial Code," 13 Bus. Law. 490, 491 (1958). For further
particulars on this theme, see Schnader, supra note 43, at 118.
46 Merrill, "Uniform Correct Construction of Uniform Laws," 49 A.B.AJ. 545,546 (1963);
Schnader, supra note 44. In this respect Professor Merrill's article is especially notable.
Professor Merrill convincingly insists on the necessity of "uniform correct construction"
from the outset by courts dealing with the Code in order to maintain the uniformity
required by the Code's own provisions. To that end he thereupon sets forth a series of
resources available for lawyers to use to aid the courts in achieving such "uniform correct
construction" of the Uniform Commercial Code.
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section (2), in the light of current continually changing marketing facts.
We can look, also in the same light, at subsection (3) of section 1-102.
In such a look, what can we see? A powerful triple combination of
"underlying purposes and policies": 1. to modernize obsolescent and
outdated law that frankly no longer fits current marketing facts (section
1-102(2) (a)); 2. to permit current expansion of commercial practices
through custom, usage and agreement of parties, thereby promoting cur-
rent adaptation of marketing practices to continually changing and
growing needs of buyers (section 1-102 (2) (b)) ; 3. to let parties by agree-
ment, in order to fit their changing needs, vary the effect of most Code
provisions (section 1-102(3)). All these "underlying purposes and
policies" are included in Code section 1-102.
Taken together, these provisions go far beyond the single acknowl-
edged purpose of construing to promote uniformity which is found in
both subdivision (c) of subsection (2) of section 1-102 and in our
separate Uniform Acts. No longer is the primary aim merely uniformity
with prior law and practice, however obsolescent. Under the Code, but
not under our separate Uniform Acts, the frankly acknowledged purpose
and policy is that of change and growth with changing times, cir-
cumstances and needs of buyers. Devotion to uniformity with the reced-
ing and perhaps obsolescent past shall not under Code law interfere
unduly with present evolutionary growth with its focus on current
changing and foreseeable needs of buyers.
Under section 1-102(1), the Code "shall be liberally construed and
applied to promote" these "underlying purposes and policies." This
liberal construction of the Code's triple combination of underlying
purposes and policies tends powerfully to move goods more freely
to market. It tends to achieve the common purpose of parties to
get the goods to the buyers when and where they need them "as if the
other party had fully performed" (as quoted in Code Section 1-106(1)).
This perspective, too, is shown in the Code comment to section 1-102-
matter dealt with in the following discussion.
Evolutionary Growth: 2. To Fill Unforeseen Gaps, Analogize Directly
From Code's Own Provisions
The Uniform Commercial Code, in section 1-102(1), expressly
provides that "This Act shall be liberally construed and applied
to promote its underlying purposes and policies." This provision mani-
festly was intended by its draftsmen to mean what it literally says:




It is intended to make it possible for the law embodied in this Act to be
developed by the courts in the light of unforeseen and new circumstances
and practices. However, the proper construction of the Act requires that its
interpretation and application be limited to its reason.
The Act should be construed in accordance with its underlying pur-
poses and policies. The text of each section should be read in the light of
the purpose and policy of the rule or principle in question, as also of the
Act as a whole, and the application of the language should be construed
narrowly or broadly, as the case may be, in conformity with the purposes
and policies involved.
Included in Code comment 1 to section 1-102 are examples of anal-
ogizing by our courts directly from provisions in our separate Uniform
Acts. For emphasis these examples may be severally numbered as fol-
lows, though recited in the comment's own words:
1. They have recognized the policies embodied in an act as applicable
in reason to subject-matter which was not expressly included in the lan-
guage of the act. Commercial Nat. Bank of New Orleans v. Canal-Louisiana
Bank & Trust Co., 239 U.S. 520, 36 S. Ct. 194, 60 L.Ed. 417 (1916)
(bona fide purchase policy of Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act extended
to case not covered but of equivalent nature).
2. They have done the same where reason and policy so required,
even where the subject-matter had been intentionally excluded from the
act in general. Agar v. Orda, 264 N.Y. 248, 190 N.E. 479 (1934) (Uni-
form Sales Act change in seller's remedies applied to contract for sale of
choses in action even though the general coverage of that Act was inten-
tionally limited to goods "other than things in action."). They have
implemented a statutory policy with liberal and useful remedies not pro-
vided in the statutory text.
3. They have disregarded a statutory limitation of remedy where the
reason of the limitation did not apply. Fiterman v. J. N. Johnson & Co.,
156 Minn. 201, 194 N.W. 399 (1923) (requirement of return of the goods
as a condition to rescission for breach of warranty; also, partial rescission
allowed).
To these specific examples this Code comment adds the following
general observation:
Nothing in this Act stands in the way of the continuance of such
action by the courts.
With but slight change in wording subsection (1) has been a part of
the Uniform Commercial Code, section 1-102, from its first tentative
draft in 1949 to its enactment as it stands today. So, too, has its Code
comment explanation and its examples set out above.
Legislatures enacted without change section 1-102, including its sub-
section (1). They did so "in reliance on the recommendations of the
sponsor organizations and without detailed study."4 7 The foregoing
47 Kripke, "The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code,"
1962 U. Ill. L.F. 321, 328.
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quoted words, particularly "in reliance . . . without detailed study per-
sonally by the legislators themselves," seem to correctly summarize the
legislative history of the actual enactment of the Uniform Commercial
Code.
48
What does this legislative history show with respect to how the Code
itself requires-or at least authorizes-its provisions to be construed?
Whether expressed in terms of "legislative intent" or of "legislative pur-
pose," the general legislative agreement with the purposes and policies
expressed by the Code's draftsmen supports the Code requirement that its
provisions be liberally construed and applied to promote evolutionary
growth as well as uniformity of law.
In disputed claimed applications of various provisions of the Code
those two basic purposes may either conflict or interplay with each other.
In such events, how does the Code itself require, or at least authorize, its
provisions to be construed?
The answer to this basic question is suggested in the Code comments
to section 1-102:
UCC § 1-102, comment 1: The Act should be construed in accordance
with its underlying purposes and policies [and] . . . the application of the
language should be construed narrowly or broadly, as the case may be, in
conformity with the purposes and policies involved.
However, the proper construction of the Act requires that its inter-
pretation and application be limited to its reason.
UCC § 1-102, comment 2: But the Code seeks to avoid the type of inter-
ference with evolutionary growth found in [case cited] ....
This answer-uniformity expanded by the necessity of evolutionary
growth-was prepared by the Code draftsmen and accepted and sup-
ported by the sponsor organizations. It has been a part of the Code's
legislative history, in practically unchanged form, from the outset.
48 Drafting stages of the UCC tested out many controversial and divergent proposals
about what its provisions should include. For informative details touching many vivid
examples of such proposals, and what happened to them, see Braucher, "Legislative History
of the Uniform Commercial Code," 58 Colum. L. Rev. 799-814 (1958); Kripke, supra
note 47, at 321-32.
For New York, of course, the most elaborate single presentation of this drafting process
appears in the six volumes of reports of the New York Law Revision Commission: 1954, two
volumes; 1955, three volumes; 1956, one volume.
For California the most extensive single presentation of this process now available ap-
pears in the Cal. Senate Fact Finding Committee on Judiciary, Report No. 6, 316-815
(1959-1961). This report covers the Uniform Commercial Code. From page 316 to page
815 it presents some five hundred pages of studies and reports on controversial and divergent
proposals about what the UCC provisions should include. At page 815 came the end, so
far as the 1961 session of the Legislature was concerned. The Judiciary Committee voted to
refer the bill to the Interim Committee for further study.
In 1963, after this "further study," the bill for enacting the UCC in California unan-
imously passed both the Assembly and the Senate, without debate, on roll call. Cal.
Senate Jour. 1104 (March 27, 1963) (vote: 29-0); Cal. Assembly Jour. 2874 (May 3,
1963) (amended by unanimous consent); Cal. Assembly Jour. 3611 (May 20, 1963) (vote:




As was previously stated, the legislatures and legislators enacted the
Code "without detailed study" by themselves personally, but "in reliance
on the recommendations of the sponsor organizations."49 Was their "reli-
ance" confined to the mere above-mentioned words5° of section 1-102 and
its comment? Of course not. It extended also to their meaning and pur-
pose as consistently explained from the outset by the sponsor organi-
zations,5 including in appropriate cases analogizing directly from the
Code's own provisions.52 That would seem a highly significant inference."
49 See note 47 supra.
50 See notes 15-18 supra.
51 Kripke, supra note 47, at 327-28. Note the following excerpts:
The Code was "lawyers legislation," largely outside the potential understanding of
most members of state legislatures, and too big to be grasped by even the studious
lawyer members. Difficult legislation like this without popular appeal can seldom be
passed without a broad consensus of agreement of interested parties . . . .The Code
would have been a sitting duck target for any determined special interest of combina-
tion of special interests who chose to attack one or more features of the bill per-
sistently ....
There was no demand for a revolutionary reshaping of commercial law, but only
for an effort to modernize and to regain uniformity. The result is in keeping with
the general nature of the work of the sponsor organizations and with the expec-
tations of many state legislatures and individual legislators who have approved the
Code in reliance on the recommendation of the sponsor organizations and without
detailed study.
52 In this connection analogizing directly from the statute deserves some special atten-
tion. See Braucher, supra note 48, at 810 and the footnote material there cited. As § 1-102
stood in 1950 and in earlier preliminary drafts, it provided expressly in subsection 3, as
it then stood, for analogizing directly from the statute "when the circumstances and under-
lying reasons justify the extending its application." Earlier this had also been coupled with
a provision for analogical extension or limitation by judicial decision like other common-
law principles. In support of these tentative draft provisions, the prepared official com-
ment recited at some length the same judicial decisions that now appear in comment 1
to § 1-102. The above mentioned express language of subsection 3 as it then stood was
later deleted. This was done in deference to argument that it led to uncertainty.
This deletion was understood by the sponsors, says Professor Braucher, as leaving the matter
open, rather than reversing the policy. Braucher, supra note 48, at 810. The text of
§§ 1-102(1)-(2) was thereafter completed as they now stand. Section 1-102, com-
ment 1 still refers to the same earlier cited precedents for extension or limitation by
analogy as justified by its underlying reason-precedents under our separate Uniform
Acts-adding for good measure "nothing in this Act stands in the way of the continuance
of such action by the courts." See also notes 7, 8, 26 supra and accompanying text.
As a California lawyer, let me add some purely personal words. The California Civil
Code codifies certain familiar maxims of jurisprudence:
Sec. 3510. When the reason of a rule ceases, so should the rule itself.
Sec. 3511. Where the reason is the same, the rule should be the same.
These were enacted in 1872 as copied, from the proposed Field Code for New York, the
well-known proposed codification of that time for Anglo-American common law.
These sections of the California Civil Code are found in division 4, part 4 of the Civil
Code as a whole. These sections are not included among the Civil Code sections specifically
repealed or modified by the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code in Cal. Stat.
1963 ch. 819. Its repealer and specially amending sections directly touching other California
statutes, namely sections 2 to 52, inclusive, appear at pages 1997-2015. Nowhere in these
eighteen pages are these two Civil Code sections mentioned; nor is part 4 or division 4, of
which they are a part.
The maxims of Anglo-American jurisprudence expressed in the above-mentioned sections
of the California Civil Code still stand as statutory law in California.
53 Example from 1963 regular session of the California Legislature in enacting the
Uniform Commercial Code.
That statute as enacted, became Cal. Stat. 1963 ch. 819. It covers 166 printed pages and
is one of 2181 statutes enacted at this regular session. Those 2181 statutes enacted cover
3963 printed pages.
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Evolutionary Growth: 3. To Provide Equitable "Safety Valves" Against
Undue Harshness-Also To Analogize Directly From the Code's
"Safety Valve" Provisions to Appropriate New Applications
Freely bargained and changing marketing practices confront many
perils in present-day evolutionary growth. Styles in clothing change. Cars
wear out, or give way to later more desired models. So do refrigerators,
television sets, many kinds of musical instruments, railroad cars, and
highway trucks. Transcontinental piston-driven planes give way to larger
and faster jets. Already supersonic transportation and communication
satellites prod at marketing's near-future prospects.5 4
Time and change can happen to them all." This evolutionary market-
ing race is not always to the swift. Business uncertainties abound. Mis-
taken business judgment as to future prospects makes many a contract
unprofitable. Many a business is wrecked.56 Also, in such a freely bar-
gained race, sharp practice and hard bargains can readily occur. Such
individual calamities beset evolutionary growth in marketing practices.
Victims of business misfortune, as also "underdogs" whose rosy bar-
gains become thorny burdens--companion types in business distress-cry
out for relief. Merely mechanical application of legal rules can in such
cases operate very harshly. If a deal is regarded as taking "a pound of
flesh," its enforcement is widely resented as unjust. In our Anglo-Ameri-
can legal tradition, need for "tempering such winds to the shorn lamb"
has long been recognized."7 Equitable principles, despite their elusive
boundaries, are widely used to mitigate unduly harsh literal application
Senate Bill No. 118 by enactment became Cal. Stat. 1963 ch. 819: the UCC. The Cal.
Senate Jour. 4879 (1963) indexes Senate action on this bill.
For this regular session the Cal. Senate Jour. covers 4847 printed pages and the Cal.
Assembly Jour., 6346 pages-a total, of 11,193 printed pages.
There were, of course, several thousand other bills for proposed statutes or amendments
which failed of enactment. Enough said.
54 Ways, supra note 39; "Special Report: The Airlines' Golden Age," Business Week,
March 28, 1964, p. 52.
55 No company ever stops changing. Change will come, for better or worse .... No
fixed, inflexible rule can ever be substituted for the exercise of sound business judg-
ment in the decision-making process.
Each new generation must meet changes. . . .The work of creating goes on.
Ways, supra note 39, at 443-44.
56 Example. The well-known loss of market leadership by Ford Motor Co. with its
perennial static Model T utility car in the 1920's. See Sloan, supra note 38, at 162-63.
Another example. Ford's marketing debacle with its intermediate bulky Edsel in the late
1950's after market demand shifted sharply away from that type, and toward such light
compact cars as Corvair and Falcon. See Sloan, supra note 38, at 441-43; "Special Report:
Market Research: Scouting the Trail for Marketers," Business Week, April 18, 1964, p. 90.
57 Example. The centuries old invention by English Chancellors of the "equity of re-
demption," familiar in real property mortgage law, refusing literal enforcement of un-
conscionable forfeiture agreements clogging this equity of redemption.
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of legal rules. "When the reason of a rule ceases, so should the rule
itself. 58
What does the Code do "to temper such winds to the shorn lamb" in
marketing practices? Notably, two things: 1. It provides equitable safety
valves. 2. It makes them authoritative for construing the Code as a whole.
The Code enacts various leading historical safety valves of equitable
principles which are declaratory of flexible "equity law." Code provi-
sions make their ramifications throughout the Code readily findable. The
following are leading examples:
Section 1-102(3): ... the obligations of good faith, diligence, reason-
ableness and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by agree-
ment but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which
the performance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are
not manifestly unreasonable.
Section 1-103: Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this
Act, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the
law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud,
misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating
or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions.
Various other instances of enactment of such equitable safety valves can
readily be pointed out throughout the Code. Conspicuous among them is
section 2-302 (1) which provides that:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the con-
tract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application
of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
Comment 1 to section 1-102 expressly gives these equitable safety
valves the Code's controlling force on how in application correctly to
construe and apply the entire Code itself: "narrowly or broadly, as the
case may be, in conformity with the purposes and policies involved."
This interpretation is expressly authorized by other provisions, notably in
article 1," the general article on how to construe and apply the Code as
58 See notes 18, 52 supra and accompanying text.
59 See notes 18, 26, 52 supra. Consider the following passages from Nutting & Elliott,
Cases on Legislation 294-95 (3d ed. 1964):
Statutory interpretation as a component of the judicial task and function is not-
and indeed in its nature it cannot be-an exact science. It calls for the exercise of judicial
discretion and judicial statesmanship of a high order. To aid the courts in the proper and
wise performance of this function, a basic rule of construction like the "mischief rule"
should be accorded preference over a too-rigid adherence to the strict letter of the
law with its concomitant policy of "letting the chips fall where they may."
Flexible use of the canons and maxims of grammatical usage, and flexible inter-
pretation of particular words, as already manifest in a great and growing body of
English and American decisions, should continue. All component parts of the official
text of an enacted law-its punctuation, its title, its preamble, its chapter and section
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a whole. Though these provisions have been previously referred to in this
article, it will be helpful to here restate them together:
Section 1-102(3): . . . the obligations of good faith, diligence, reason-
ableness and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by agree-
ment ....
Section 1-102(1): This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to
promote its underlying purposes and policies.
Section 1-103: Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this
Act, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant.., shall
supplement its provisions.
Section 1-106(1): The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally
administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a
position as if the other party had fully performed ....
Various sections in other articles of the Code further set out how in
certain circumstances correctly to construe and apply certain particular
provisions. A few examples are mentioned in the footnote. 0
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
The Code sets out two basic general purposes for construing its own
provisions: uniformity of law and evolutionary growth. Both appear
very clearly in section 1-102 and its Code comment, supplemented by the
other above-mentioned provisions in article 1.
These are the most authoritative general Code sources on how to con-
strue and apply its own provisions in current marketing disputes.
headings, its context as a whole, as well as illustrations and marginal notes-should
be regarded as legitimate guides in resolving doubt or clarifying ambiguities.
Finally, extrinsic aids-not only background history, but also parliamentary proceed-
ings, reports of committees, legislative debates, other statutes, and prior and contem-
poraneous construction-are often available as permissible sources of information and
enlghtment. Given full access to these resources, judges can be counted on to use
them wisely, to balance them fairly, and thereby to assist in clarifying the legislative
intent and in achieving, wherever possible, the ultimate fulfillment of the legislative
purpose.
60 The following examples of the Uniform Commercial Code sections, with brief word-
ing on content of each, are listed in numerical order. 1. § 1-203, good faith; 2. § 1-204,
reasonable time, seasonably; 3. § 1-208, limits on option to accelerate, and burden of
proof on good faith therein; 4. § 2-103, "good faith" includes reasonable commercial stand-
ards in case of merchants; 5. § 2-105, commercial usage in the relevant market determines
what is a "commercial unit"; 6. § 2-302, courts may refuse to enforce unconscionable deals
or clauses in deals; 7. § 2-716, specific performance may be decreed, not only where goods
are unique but also in other proper circumstances; 8. § 2-718(1), limit standards spelled
out for liquidated damages; 9. § 2-719(3), deals may limit consequential damages unless
unconscionable, and certain prima fade differences between cases recognized in its ap-
plication; 10. § 9-207, various matters included in "reasonable care" in the custody of
collateral in secured party's possession.
